Breaking the Pattern: Georgia’s Pattern Jury Instructions and the Evidence Code
By: Vanessa Galvan
In White v. Stanley, 893 S.E.2d 466 (Ga. App. 2023), Rhonda White brought a negligence action against Kelli Stanley and Jason Cartee arising out of an automobile accident. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant and the plaintiff appealed. The plaintiff requested a new trial, arguing the court’s instruction to the jury on the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard was confusing and an inaccurate statement of the law. The court denied the plaintiff’s request for a new trial but agreed the jury instruction was erroneous.
In 2012, Georgia overhauled its evidence code to resemble its federal counterpart more closely. The former statute, O.C.G.A. § 24-1-1(5), defined the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard as “that superior weight of evidence upon the issues involved, which, while not enough to free the mind wholly from a reasonable doubt, is yet sufficient to incline a reasonable and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than to the other.”
Georgia’s revamped evidence code no longer includes a statutory definition of the preponderance standard. Nevertheless, Georgia’s pattern jury instructions (which judges often encourage litigants to rely on when proposing jury charges in favor of judicial efficiency) track the previous statutory definition of the preponderance standard.1 Looking to the pattern jury instructions, the White Trial Court charged the jury using the “reasonable doubt” language from the former statute, O.C.G.A. § 24-1-1(5).
In White, the court of appeals stated the charge as presented “drew the jury's attention to the reasonable-doubt standard without explaining the important differences between the civil and criminal standards of proof or making clear that the higher burden applied in criminal cases did not apply in this particular civil case.”2 Ultimately, the court of appeals held the current pattern instruction bore “no relation to the straightforward definitions of preponderance of the evidence provided by our Supreme Court and federal courts.”3
Other than identifying the shortcomings of the current patterned charge, the court did not propose an acceptable charge. This lack of guidance could cause confusion as litigants prepare jury charges on the preponderance of the evidence standard moving forward. Nonetheless, the court’s analysis provides insight. In particular, the White Court looked to the General Assembly’s intent when enacting the current evidence code which was to model the Georgia Code to the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court held “. . . because our General Assembly's codified intent in enacting the current evidence code was to, for the most part, model it after the Federal Rules of Evidence (which do not provide a definition of preponderance of the evidence), we agree with White that we must look to federal caselaw in determining Georgia's legal definition of this evidentiary standard.” Given this ruling, Georgia litigators should consider adopting a jury pattern instruction that is in line with federal caselaw.
1 White, 893 S.E.2d at 469-70.
2 Id. at 472.
3 Id., see also United States v. Watkins, 10 F.4th 1179, 1184 (11th Cir. 2021).
Attorney Contact Info
Vanessa Galvan
vanessa.galvan@swiftcurrie.com
404.595.2218